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Abstract
Technological leadership has shifted at various times from one
country to another. This analysis proposes a mechanism that endoge-
nously explains this perpetual cycle of technological leapfrogging by
incorporating international knowledge spillovers into a two-country
dynamic model of innovation with the dynamic optimization of an
innitely-lived consumer. In the model, innovation productivity in
each country endogenously increases over time because of domestic
learning-by-doing and learning from foreign capital. The analysis
shows that if international spillovers through learning from foreign
capital are su¢ ciently large, technological leadership may rst shift
from one country to another, and then perpetually alternate between
the two countries.
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1 Introduction
Throughout history, technological leadership has shifted at various times
from one country to another. For instance, during the early 17th century,
Venice and Spanish Lombardy were among the most technologically advanced
regions in Europe (Davids 2008, p. 2). Over the centuries, the technological
center of gravity of Europe then moved, residing at various times in Italy,
southern Germany, the Netherlands, France, England, and then again in
Germany(Mokyr 1990, p. 207). Some economic historians even claim that
the US had begun to lose its technological leadership by the early 1990s
(Nelson and Wright 1992).
An important question is why such economic and technological leapfrog-
ging takes place. An equally fundamental question is why technological
leapfrogging has repeatedly occurred. To respond to the rst question, Brezis,
Krugman, and Tsiddon (1993) provided an economic explanation based on
major exogenous changes in technology. When such change occurs, the new
technology appears less productive for leading nations, given their extensive
experience with older technologies. Lagging nations with less experience will
then introduce the new technology. As these accumulate su¢ cient experi-
ence with the new technology, the leapfrogging of technological leadership
occurs. We may apply this same theory to the second question by consider-
ing the perpetual cycles of leapfrogging as responses to the perpetual changes
in technology. This explanation is, however, essentially exogenous, as it is
based on macro shocks in technology. Although a variety of studies have
followed Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon, no existing work formally provides
a fully endogenous explanation that responds to both of these questions.
The aim of this analysis is to develop a fully endogenous theory that ex-
plains both the leapfrogging of technological leadership and the perpetual
cycle in technological leadership. For this purpose, we focus on interna-
tional knowledge spillovers in a two-country dynamic general equilibrium
model of innovation with the dynamic optimization of consumption and sav-
ing by an innitely-lived consumer. As rms in a country develop innova-
tions in this model, their innovation productivity endogenously increases over
time because of domestic learning-by-doing and learning from foreign capital
ows, both of which allow knowledge di¤usion into the model.1 By assuming
1This approach follows a number of related theoretical models (Brezis and Tsiddon
1998; van de Klundert and Smulders 2001; Desmet 2002). As argued by Brezis (1995),
foreign capital plays a role in industrialization and development processes. We may also
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that technological leadership is the state whereby a given country innovates
most among all countries, we demonstrate that if the international knowledge
spillovers are su¢ ciently e¢ cient, technological leadership by that country
will eventually shift to another country, and then perpetually alternate be-
tween countries.
The key driving force behind perpetual leapfrogging is the learning abil-
ity of a country from abroad. For example, a technologically lagging country
may learn much more from the rms in the leading country than the lead-
ing country learns from the rms in the lagging country. Meanwhile, in a
similar fashion, domestic learning-by-doing takes place that increases inno-
vation productivity in each country. The analysis shows that if a country can
learn su¢ ciently from the foreign country, technological leadership is likely
to perpetually alternate between the countries.
In order to capture cyclical phenomena in the simplest fashion, we follow
Shleifer (1986), Deneckere and Judd (1992), Gale (1996), Francois and Shi
(1999), and Matsuyama (1999, 2001) by assuming that patents last only
for one period. This assumption implies that the length of a unit period
is su¢ ciently long, which can be somewhere around 20 years. Given that,
in reality, many of innovated consumption goods become obsolete before
patents expire, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that innovations are
made obsolete in a single period. In line with those existing papers, we
assume the temporary nature of the monopoly enjoyed by innovators, which
plays a role in explaining perpetual leapfrogging.
Our analysis relates most to studies in international economics following
the work in Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon (1993). Most closely related is
a paper by van de Klundert and Smulders (2001), who focus on an inter-
national capital market in an endogenous growth model. By allowing for
nontradable goods, capital ows, and endogenous innovations, they explain
the well-documented fact that a leading country (e.g., England) tends to lose
its technological leadership by becoming a rentier economy that invests in a
new technologically leading country. However, as in the other related stud-
ies described below, their analysis does not address the second question of
why the leapfrogging of technology leadership produces a perpetual cycle. In
an earlier contribution, Brezis and Tsiddon (1998) show that capital mobil-
accept that international capital ows, as well as imports, are an important channel for
international knowledge spillover, as discussed in the literature (Grossman and Helpman
1991; Feenstra 1996). See Branstetter (2006) for recent empirical evidence.
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ity may spur leapfrogging. Desmet (2002) extends the Ricardian model in
Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon (1993) to a HeckscherOhlin framework by
introducing mobile capital and spillovers.
In other work, Desmet species a mechanism by which the most advanced
country may reinforce its dominant position by adopting the new technology
if spillovers between the old and new technologies are su¢ ciently strong,
which weakens the opportunity for lagging nations to take o¤ and leapfrog.
In a di¤erent context, the literature on industrial organization has claried
the conditions for leapfrogging. For example, Motta, Thisse, and Cabrales
(1997) illustrate in a model with vertical product di¤erentiation that free
trade may either encourage or reverse quality leadership. The present study
extends these existing studies by explicitly and formally providing a fully
endogenous explanation of why leapfrogging takes place perpetually using a
single factor, namely, international knowledge spillovers. Ohyama and Jones
(1995) provide a similar explanation for leapfrogging by rms, with a focus
on comparative advantage. They argue that lagging regions typically have
a comparative advantage in the new technology as the leading country has
greater experience in the older technologies. This provides lagging regions
with an opportunity to adopt the new technology rst.
The notion of perpetual leapfrogging is not new in the context of price
competition between rms. For instance, Giovannetti (2001) considers a
duopoly in which rms considering innite technological adoption set prices
with Bertrand competition in the product market. Using this model, Giovan-
netti identies the conditions whereby rms alternate in adopting the new
technology, thereby representing a leapfrogging process. He shows that de-
mand conditions, such as price elasticity, play a role in determining whether
leapfrogging can be perpetual in Bertrand competition. Lee, Kim, and Lim
(2011) have provided recent empirical support for this contention.
In demonstrating the cyclical occurrence of leapfrogging, we reveal that
the dynamic general equilibrium of the model is characterized by a simple
nonlinear dynamic system in discrete time. Along an equilibrium path gen-
erated by this system, we show that technological leadership may uctuate
perpetually. Nonlinear equilibrium dynamics in discrete time provide a useful
tool for describing real-world, complicated economic phenomena (Nishimura
and Yano 2008), which may include the perpetual cycle of leapfrogging. Our
analysis extends this line of research by demonstrating the possibility of a
perpetual cycle of leapfrogging using a one-dimensional nonlinear di¤erence
equation.
4
2 The model
We assume time is discrete and extends from t = 0 to +1. Consider two
countries, A and B, with identical preferences, and which di¤er only in their
initial levels of innovation productivity. The countries are denoted by i or k
(i = A; B; k = A; B), using a superscript for variables pertaining to the
production side and a subscript for those pertaining to the consumption side.
There is a continuum of di¤erentiated consumption goods in each period t.
Each good is indexed by j. Given we later allow for foreign direct investment
(FDI), the country where a particular rm innovates and manufactures may
change. Let  i(t) be the set of innovated goods in period t by the rms in
country i and let i(t) be the set of goods manufactured in country i in period
t. Let N(t) =
R
j2fA(t)[B(t)g dj be the total number of goods manufactured
in t.
2.1 Consumption
In each country, an innitely-lived representative consumer inelastically sup-
plies L units of labor for production and R&D in every period. Note that
the two countries are assumed to have equal labor forces, L. We endow both
consumers with the same intertemporal utility function
Ui =
1X
t=0
t lnui(t);
where  2 (0; 1) is the time preference rate. The temporary utility ui(t) is
dened on the set fA(t) [ B(t)g of goods manufactured in both countries
(free trade), taking the standard DixitStiglitz form:
ui(t) =
Z
j2fA(t)[B(t)g
xi(j; t)
1 dj
 1
1 
; (1)
where xi(j; t) is the consumption of good j in country i. Parameter  2
(0; 1) characterizes preferences in the two senses. Let Ei(t) be the spending
in country i. Solving the utility maximization problem in (1) leads to the
demand function for good j as xi(j; t) = p(j; t) (1=)Ei(t)=P (t)1 (1=), where
p(j; t) denotes the price of good j and P (t) is the price index.2 Aggregating
2As is well known, the index is dened as Pt =
R
j2fA(t)[B(t)g p(j; t)
1 (1=)dj
 1
1 (1=)
.
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these expressions, we obtain the derived market demand, xA(j; t)+xB(j; t) 
x(j; t), as
x(j; t) =
E(t)p(j; t) (1=)
P (t)1 (1=)
; (2)
where E(t) = EA(t)+EB(t) is the aggregate spending in period t. The price
elasticity of demand is constant at 1= for any j.
Solving the dynamic optimization of the consumers utility for consump-
tion and saving or investment decisions under the intertemporal budget con-
straint results in the usual Euler equation Ei(t+1)=Ei(t) = (1+r(t)), where
r(t) is the interest rate in period t. We then obtain
E(t+ 1)
E(t)
= (1 + r(t)): (3)
2.2 Innovation, manufacturing, and capital ows
A single rm innovates and monopolistically supplies each di¤erentiated con-
sumption good, following the R&D-based growth model with expanding va-
riety (Romer 1990). Innovating a new good takes one period. When an R&D
rm in country i invests 1=Ai(t 1) units of labor in period t 1; it innovates
a new good at the end of period t  1. In the subsequent period, t, the rm
sets up a production plant. The rm will choose the country in which to
manufacture the good in order to maximize prots. In equilibrium, the rm
may transfer production to a foreign country k(6= i) through FDI, as foreign
prots may be greater.3
After the rm chooses the country in which to manufacture, it monopo-
listically produces x(j; t) units of good j using domestic labor as the input.
Assume that there are constant returns to scale in the production of good
j and that the productivity of labor is the same in both countries, which is
normalized to be one.4 The marginal cost is thus equal to the wage rate in
country i, wi(t).
3In line with the literature on international trade and growth (Lai 1998), we do not
distinguish between the various forms of production transfer, including fully and partially
owned subsidiaries and licensing.
4Here we simply consider that e¢ ciency in manufacturing is normalized across coun-
tries. We can extend this simple setting by allowing for country-specic manufacturing
e¢ ciency and its endogenous progress. In such an extended model, we can easily verify
that the comparative advantage between R&D and manufacturing (rather than the ab-
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When the rm that innovates technology for good j in period t chooses to
manufacture in country i, captured by j 2 i(t), it maximizes monopolistic
prots by setting a price at p(j; t) = wi(t)=(1   )  pi(t), taking into
account the constant price elasticity 1= according to (2). This monopolistic
price does not depend on the country for innovation, only on the country for
manufacture. With this monopolistic price pi(t), we can derive from (2) the
demand and prot functions as
x(j; t) =
E(t)pi(t) (1=)
P (t)1 (1=)
 xi(t) (4)
and
(j; t) = E(t)

pi(t)
P (t)
1 (1=)
 i(t) (5)
for j 2 i(t) (i = A; B). As rms prefer the country where prots are higher,
the net value of the rm innovating in country i is expressed as
V i(t  1) = maxf
A(t); B(t)g
1 + r(t  1)  
wi(t  1)
Ai(t  1) : (6)
In order to capture cyclical phenomena in the simplest fashion, we follow
Shleifer (1986), Deneckere and Judd (1992), Gale (1996), Francois and Shi
(1999), and Matsuyama (1999, 2001) by assuming that patents last only
for one period. This assumption implies that the length of a unit period is
su¢ ciently long, which can be somewhere around 20 years given the real-
world patent length. Given that, in reality, many of innovated consumption
goods become obsolete before patents expire, we may assume that innovations
are made obsolete in a single period.5 As shown below, this assumption makes
the analysis tractable without any fundamental change in the results. Finally,
free entry guarantees that the net value of a rm should not be positive in
equilibrium: V i(t  1)  0 for each i.
solute advantage in R&D) plays an important role in perpetual leapfrogging, although the
resutls and their intuition in perpetual leapfrogging do not change fundamentally.
5This assumption may also be justied if each innovation could be interpreted as specic
and relatively minor. For example, innovation in this model would be represented by
the specic innovation associated with iPhone 4S instead of smart phones, cell phones, or
information technology more generally.
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2.3 Learning-by-doing and international spillovers
Technology advances with two kinds of learning: domestic learning-by-doing
and learning from abroad. First, we consider that a country that develops
an innovation immediately learns how to innovate e¢ ciently. Assume that
the productivity increase for a country, Ai(t + 1)   Ai(t), linearly depends
on the number of domestic innovations,
R
 i(t)
dj  N i(t),6 which is a proxy
for the ow of knowledge generated as a by-product of the innovations in
period t (Romer 1990). Second, the international knowledge spillovers ac-
company FDI, such that we assume that country i learns from its foreign
capital inows. The productivity of country i also increases linearly withR
j2 k(t 1)\i(t) dj M i(t), with k 6= i; which is the amount of foreign capital
that ows into the country. Accordingly, we simply describe technological
progress using
Ai(t+ 1)  Ai(t) = N i(t) + M i(t); (7)
where  2 [0; 1] captures the e¢ ciency of the contribution of international
knowledge spillovers through foreign capital inows to technological progress.
The e¢ ciency of international knowledge spillovers increases with . If  = 1,
spillovers from FDI are as e¢ cient as domestic spillovers; if  = 0, there is
no learning at all from foreign capital.
3 Perpetual leapfrogging
In this section, we prove the main result that technological leadership may
uctuate over time, thereby perpetually moving back and forth between coun-
tries. To do this, we identify a condition under which no country can retain
technology leadership for innitely successive periods. Before proceeding, we
provide a formal denition of the concept of technological leadership. Tak-
ing into account the notion in economic history (David 2008),7 we refer to
a country that develops innovations most among the countries as the tech-
nological leader, and a country developing relatively few innovations as a
lagging country. In the present model, and as will be made apparent later,
this denition is equivalent to that in trade theory (Brezis, Krugman, and
6Note NA(t)+NB(t) = N(t+1); reecting the assumption that innovating a new good
takes one period.
7David (2008) considered that a country that has technological leadership plays an
initiating role in the development of new technologies across a wide variety of elds.
8
Tsiddon 1993), which denes leadership as the state whereby a given coun-
try has the highest productivity among the countries. Thus, in equilibrium,
country i innovates more if and only if its innovation productivity is higher;
N i(t) > Nk(t) if and only if Ai(t) > Ak(t): For sake of simplicity, we will use
Ai(t) > Ak(t) to mention that country i is the technological leader.
Without loss of generality, we suppose that country A is the leading
country in period t, AA(t) > AB(t) (and thus NA(t) > NB(t) in equilibrium),
and refer to this situation as regime A. If AA(t) < AB(t) (and thus NA(t) <
NB(t) in equilibrium), we refer to it as regime B.
In any period of time, the model can be regarded as a variant of a con-
ventional two-good Ricardian model, where two outputs are considered in-
novation and production. Given AA(t) > AB(t), there are potentially three
possible equilibria in period t: (1) one in which both countries engage in
manufacturing; (2) one in which both countries engage in R&D; (3) one in
which both countries are specialized. We adopt a su¢ ciently large  to focus
on the most important case. The assumptions that  is su¢ ciently large and
that the two countries have the same labor force amount L rule out the rst
and third kinds of equilibria and ensure that the leading country will always
be specialized in innovation and the lagging country will be involved in both
R&D and manufacturing.8 Given the same labor force, this implies that the
leading country innovates more than the lagging country; NA(t) > NB(t) for
AA(t) > AB(t):
In the equilibrium (2), manufacturing takes place only in country B; so
that A(t+ 1) < B(t+ 1) must hold. Then, by substituting the price pi(t)
into (4) and (5), we can have
xB(t) = (1  )A
B(t)E(t)
N(t)!(t)
(8)
and
B(t+ 1) = 
E(t+ 1)
N(t+ 1)
: (9)
As R&D takes place in both countries in this case, the two countries would
share the same cost for R&D in equilibrium; wA(t)=AA(t) = wB(t)=AB(t) =
!(t). By V A(t) = V B(t) = 0 andmaxfA(t+1); B(t+1)g = E(t+1)=N(t+
8See the appendix for details.
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1), with the Euler equation (3), we have
E(t)
N(t+ 1)
= !(t): (10)
Suppose that one country, say A, retains the leadership for two consecu-
tive periods, assuming AA(t) > AB(t) and AA(t  1) > AB(t  1): In periods
t   1 and t, country A is specialized in R&D while B is not. By combining
(8) and (10) with N(s+1) = NA(s)+NB(s); the labor conditions in periods
t  1 and t can give rise to:
NA(s) = AA(s)L and NB(s) = 
1 +

AB(s)L  1 

AA(s)L

; (11)
where s = t  1; t.
Recall that in (7) the technological progress in period t, Ai(t+1) Ai(t),
depends on domestic innovations and a ow of foreign innovations. In period
t, by assumption, NA(t  1) innovations ow from country A to B. Thus,
AA(t+1) AA(t) = NA(t) and AB(t+1) AB(t) = NB(t)+MA(t); (12)
whereMA(t) = NA(t 1):Given AA(t) AA(t 1) = NA(t 1) by AA(t 1) >
AB(t  1); together with (11) for s = t  1, we obtain
AA(t  1) = AA(t)=(L+ 1): (13)
From (11), (12), and (13), noting s = t   1; t, we derive the equilibrium
dynamical equilibrium system in periods t and t+ 1 as follows:
(t+ 1) =
(L+ 1)(t)

1 +L+ 1

+ L(t)

=(L+ 1)  1 
1 +
 (14)
for (t) > 1 and (t  1) > 1. The condition for leapfrogging is also similar
to that originally ( > 2(1  )) given by
 >
2 (1  ) (L+ 1)
1   +  : (15)
If (15) holds, (t + 1) < 1 for (t) > 1 and (t   1) > 1; which, given
symmetry for both countries, implies that (t + 1) > 1 for (t) < 1 and
(t   1) < 1. This proves the following theorem, by applying the above
analysis to (11)(15) repeatedly to subsequent periods t+ 2; t+ 3;    :
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Theorem 1 Under the innitely-lived agents dynamic optimization, if (15)
holds, neither country can retain its technological leadership for more than
two periods in a row.
We can easily derive the next proposition from Theorem 1, noting (15).
Proposition 1 Leapfrogging may take place repeatedly and perpetually if the
e¢ ciency of international spillovers  is su¢ ciently high.
The key driving force behind perpetual leapfrogging is the learning abil-
ity of a country from abroad. In the model, the lagging country learns from
the leading countrys capital rms while the leading country does not. This
creates the possibility of leapfrogging. Needless to say, this is a very extreme
case, as specialization takes place in the present model, which can be re-
garded as a dynamic version of the Ricardian model. In reality, the leading
country also manufactures foreign innovations (those in the lagging country)
and may also learn from them. Therefore, we may assume that this model
captures one aspect of real-world behavior. That is, lagging countries may
have an advantage in international technology competition with the leading
country because they can learn from the leaders active innovation as well as
their own experience in innovation. This analysis formally shows in a two-
country model with dynamic optimization of the innitely-lived consumer
that if a country can learn su¢ ciently from the foreign country, technologi-
cal leadership is likely to perpetually alternate between the countries.9
3.1 An illustration
The previous section proved the condition of perpetual leapfrogging under
dynamic optimization, (15). To obtain a visual intuition, in this section we
provide a graphical illustration by means of the usual phase diagram. In
9Given the historical fact that technology leadership has often shifted between coun-
tries, it is important to provide an extended case comprising more than two countries.
We can demonstrate that three or more countries on an equilibrium path can perpetually
experience various forms of leapfrogging including, for example, growth miracles, in which
the least productive country leapfrogs all rival countries with higher productivity levels in
a single burst. Such growth miracles may take place sporadically or consecutively, or in a
complex combination of the two. See Furukawa (2012) for a formal analysis.
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doing so, we assume innovation activities are completed within one period.
Thus, the innovation value in (6) should be replaced by
V i(t) = maxfA(t); B(t)g   wi(t)=Ai(t): (16)
We also assume, for reasons made clear shortly, that an inverse measure of
the elasticity of substitution, ; is greater than 0:5.10 In this simplied model,
the equilibrium dynamics can be completely characterized by the following
one-dimensional di¤erence equation. See Furukawa (2012) for a proof.
(t+ 1) = ((t)) 
8>>><>>>:
L+(t)
L+1
for 0 < (t) < 1 

(L+1)(t)+L( (1 ))
L+1
for 1 

 (t) < 1
(t) L+1
(L(t)+1)+L( (1 )(t)) for 1 < (t) <

1 
(t) L+1
L(t)+1
for 
1   (t)
(17)
The equilibrium dynamical system  is autonomous and nonlinear. Figure
1 depicts the phase diagram of system  for the e¢ ciency  of knowledge
spillovers smaller than 2(1  ). There are two steady states, both of which
are stable. For all initial points, technological leadership can never alter-
nate internationally. Figure 2 depicts a typical path for the case in which
the e¢ ciency  of international spillovers exceeds 2(1   ). Given that no
steady state exists, (t) will move perpetually back and forth between the
two regimes (1;1) and (0; 1). Finally, note that the condition of perpetual
leapfrogging in the simplied model,  > 2(1   ); is similar to the original
model (15) and that  > 0:5 is a necessary condition as   1:
Appendix:
Suppose that both countries produced goods (pattern (1)). Then the
wages would be internationally equated, wA(t) = wB(t) = w(t), imply-
ing xi(t) = x(t). The labor conditions would be NA(t)=AA(t) + (N(t)  
MB(t))x(t) = L = MB(t)x(t): Since E(t)=w(t) = () 1N(t)=AA(t) from
V A(t) = 0; this implies that NA(t)=AA(t) = 2L   1 

N(t)=AA(t); noting
10A higher  indicates a lower elasticity of substitution. Li (2001) argues that the
evidence regarding whether there is any conventional value or a range of values for the
elasticity of substitution is inconclusive. For example, Broda and Weinstein (2006) show
that the elasticity of substitution is, on average, greater than two, but tends to decline
over time and is actually less than two in some sectors (e.g., motor vehicles).
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x(t) = (1   )E(t)= (w(t)N(t)) : Note that N(t) and AA(t) are given in pe-
riod t: Thus, if  is su¢ ciently large, we have NA(t)=AA(t)! 2L > L; which
violates the labor market equilibrium.
Suppose that both coutnries are completely specialized (pattern (3)).
Then the labor condirions imply NA(t)=AA(t) = L = N(t)xB(t): Noting
V A(t) = 0; we have E(t)=wA(t) = () 1N(t + 1)=AA(t): Noting xB(t) =
(1  )E(t)=  wB(t)N(t) ; thus, a resource constraint L > N(t)xB(t) by the
labor market condition requires L > (1  )L= () ; where wA(t) > wB(t)
is used. If  is su¢ ciently large, this does not hold.
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